The Rule of Law, Legal Pluralism, and Challenges to a Western-centric View: Some Very Preliminary Observations by Zumbansen, Peer
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series Research Papers, Working Papers, ConferencePapers
2017
The Rule of Law, Legal Pluralism, and Challenges to
a Western-centric View: Some Very Preliminary
Observations
Peer Zumbansen
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Zumbansen, Peer, "The Rule of Law, Legal Pluralism, and Challenges to a Western-centric View: Some Very Preliminary Observations"
(2017). Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series. 193.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/193
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2869190 
The Dickson Poon School of Law 
Somerset House East Wing 















The Rule of Law, Legal Pluralism, and 
Challenges to a Western-centric View: 























King’s College London Dickson Poon School of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series: Paper No. 2017-05 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2869190 
































 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2869190 





to	 in	 ‘legal	 assistance’	 and	 ‘law	 reform’	 projects	 and	 lives	 as	 a	 guiding	 principle	 in	
constitutions	 around	 the	world,	we	 don’t	 seem	 able	 to	 settle	 on	 a	 commonly	 agreed-





different	when	 studied	 across	 time	 and	 space.	 Complementing	 some	of	 the	work	 that	


















































the	 others	 lose	 power,	 not	 that	 they	 cease	 to	 exist.	 This	 translates	 rather	
uncomfortably	 to	 law.	 A	 law,	 or	 judicial	 decision,	 renders	 other	 views	 legally	
irrelevant.	 A	 legal	 system,	 unlike	 a	 pluralist	 political	 system,	 does	 not	 aim	 at	











the	 concept?	 Must	 we	 be	 on	 the	 look-out	 for	 judicial	 pronouncements,	 legislative	
advances	 or	 administrative	 orders	 to	 test	 the	 rule	 of	 law’s	 current	 temperature	 and	
mode	of	 operation?	 Is	 it	 sufficient	 to	 apply	 a	public	 law	 lens	 in	 order	 to	 seek	out	 the	
institutional	 and	 procedural	 forms	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law’s	 modes	 of	 existence	 and	 their	
possible	 transformations	 in	 a	 world	 marked	 by	 globalisation,	 privatization	 and	
attending	shifts	between	governmental	regulatory	prerogative	and	the	market’s	claims	
to	 ‘self-rule’?	 Or,	 ought	 we	 to	 include	 contractual	 and	 corporate	 governance	
developments,	both	still	under	the	auspices	of	private	law,	when	we	attempt	to	depict	










its	 mode	 of	 generating	 knowledge	 and	 processing	 information,	 its	 instruments	 of	
‘control’,	 of	 surveillance	 and	 intervention	 –	 how	 does	 a	 traditional	 constitutional	 or	
administrative	rule	of	law	perspective	apply	to	the	increasingly	dominant	role	played	by	
private	companies	exercising	near-to-complete	control	over	data	flows?2	Where,	in	the	
inherited	 model	 of	 constitutional	 supremacy	 and	 separation	 of	 powers	 are	 we	 to	




speak	of	 a	 rule	of	 law,	when	we	are	no	 longer	 confident	 from	which	vantage	point	 to	
define	‘citizenship’,	‘home’,	‘belonging’?4	How	are	we	to	interpret	momentous	instances,	
regarding	 their	 far-reaching	 impact,	 despite	 their	 local	 occurrence?	What	 is	 the	 long-





Not	 only,	 then,	 are	 the	 challenges	 confronting	 an	 aspirationally	 open-minded	 and	
critical	engagement	with	the	rule	of	law	political	and	geographical,	but	also	definitional.	
There	are,	arguably,	only	a	few	other	categories,	concepts	or	ideas	for	lawyers	as	heavily	
                                       





Lecture,	 Kings	 College,	 28	 April	 2016,	 available	 here:	
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2786698;	 see	 also	 Neha	 Vora,	 Impossible	
Citizens	(2013),	at	12:	“…an	approach	to	studying	citizenship	and	belonging	that	attends	to	the	circulation	
and	 practice	 of	 multiple	 forms	 of	 governance	 in	 contemporary	 nation-states.	 This	 approach	 avoids	
exceptionalizing	 particular	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 and	 instead	 acknowledges	 that	 globally	 and	 locally	
circulating	 vocabulatires	 of	 economy,	 belonging,	 and	 rights	 are	 assembled,	 disassembled,	 and	
reassembled	everywhere.”.	
5	R	(Miller)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	European	Union,	[2016]	EWHC	2768	(admin),	3	November	
2016,	 available	 at:	 https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/r-miller-v-secretary-of-state-for-exiting-
the-european-union/		






charged	 and	 contested	 as	 that	 of	 the	 ‘rule	 of	 law’	 [RoL].	While	 references	 to	 the	 RoL	
abound	 and	 the	 concept	 is	 arguably	 one	 of	 the	 most	 frequently	 alluded	 to	 when	
debating	 the	 foundations	 and	 aspirations	 of	 a	 modern	 legal	 system,7	 the	 term	 itself	
continues	 to	 remain	 open-ended,	 contested	 as	 well	 as	 burdened	 with	 conflicting	
normative	assertions:	while	 it	 conjures	community	as	well	as	 insists	on	authority	and	
emphasizes	 rule-boundedness	as	well	 as	promises	enforceability,	 it	does	not	 say	very	
much	outright	as	 to	 its	stakeholders	and	 its	constituents,	 those	who	give	 it	 legitimacy	
and	those	who	are	affected	by	it.	Whose	Rule	of	Law	are	we	speaking	of,	which	values	
are	 enshrined	 in	 its	 concrete	 instantiation	 in	 a	 particular	 place	 and	 time?	 Which	
processes	of	legitimation	and	execution	does	it	require	or	presuppose?	Which	actors	are	
considered	central	or	peripheral	to	the	optimal	operation	of	the	RoL?	Which	norms	can	




The	 significance	 of	 the	 RoL	within	 the	 legal	 (and	 political)	 imagination,	 as	 numerous	
attempts	to	define	and	conceptualize,8	theorize,	challenge9	and	resist	 it,10	have	shown,	
might	 just	as	well	be	 its	 irreducibly	ambiguous	character.	 Its	 slippery	nature	not	only	
invites	both	the	interpretation	from	various	points	of	view	and	the	translation	between	
its	use	in	legal,	political,	socio-economic,	historical	and	anthropological	and	sociological	
discourses,	 it	 demands	 them.	 But,	 seen	 through	 this	 lens,	 the	 ‘RoL	 problem’	 for	 law	
echoes	 the	 challenges	which	 other	 disciplines	 tend	 to	 encounter	with	 ‘core’	 concepts.	
Imagine	 asking	 a	 philosopher	 to	 provide	 us	 with	 a	 summary	 regarding	 the	 idea	 of	
                                       
7	 See	 the	 masterful	 analysis	 and	 overview	 of	 approaches	 by	 Brian	 Z.	 Tamanaha,	 On	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law	
(2004).	But,	see	also	the	World	Bank’s	 inclusion	of	the	RoL	as	one	of	“six	dimensions	of	governance”	as	
part	 of	 its	 “Worldwide	 Governance	 Indicators	 Programme”:	
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases/rule-of-law.	




on	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 dominant	 rule	 of	 law	 paradigm,	 in:	 Global	 Perspectives	 on	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law	 241	
(Heckman/Nelson/Cabatingan,	 eds.,	 2010),	 who	 address	 the	 RoL’s	 shortcomings	 in	 capturing	 and	
theorizing	levels	of	inequality,	using	women	as	but	one	example;	see	also	the	critique	of	the	World	Justice	
Forum’s	 ‘Rule	 of	 Law’	 index,	which	 prioritizes	 a	 limited	 range	 of	 economic	 and	 political	 factors	 to	 the	
detriment	 of	 others:	 Jothie	 Rajah,	 'Rule	 of	 Law'	 as	 Transnational	 Legal	 Order,	 in:	 Transnational	 Legal	
Orders	340	(Halliday/Shaffer,	eds.,	2015).	











debate	 the	 ‘horizontal’	and	 ‘vertical’	 situatedness	of	 legal	orders	while	simultaneously	
emphasizing	 the	 contextual	 embeddedness	 of	 the	 legal	 architecture	 in	 historically	
evolving	 political	 orders	 and,	 more	 particularly,	 that	 of	 law’s	 role	 in	 the	 West’s	
emergence	 of	 the	 nation-state15	 and	 the	 capitalist	 order.16	 On	 the	 other,	 the	 RoL’s	
normative	ambiguity,	in	other	words,	its	slippery	assertion	of	a	value	system	caught	up,	
endorsed	and	given	validity	in	the	constitution	and	the	execution	of	an	institutionalized	
legal	 architecture	 prompts	 challenge	 and	 resistance	 on	 various	 other	 levels.	 The	 RoL	
both	posits	and	questions	normative	assertions	of	a	legal	order	and	how	and	for	whom	
it	is	established.	Who	is	setting	up	the	RoL,	whose	values	does	it	serve	to	represent	and	
protect?	 As	 such,	 the	 critique	 of	 the	 RoL	 cannot	 be	 sensibly	 separated	 from	 an	
assessment	 of	 the	 historical	 and	 socio-economic	 context	 in	 which	 a	 particular	
instantiation	 of	 the	 RoL	 is	 being	 debated,	 something	 which	 E.	 P.	 Thompson	 so	
masterfully	laid	out	in	the	bulk	of	‘Whigs’	that	precedes	the	famous	observations	on	the	
rule	of	 law	at	 the	 end	of	 the	book,	 too	often	 cited	 in	 isolation	 from	 the	 rest.17	 In	 that	
context,	 then,	 it	also	became	visible	how	the	RoL	raises	significant	concerns	regarding	








15	 Austin	 Sarat/Lawrence	Douglas/Martha	Merrill	 Umphrey,	Where	 (or	What)	 Is	 the	 Place	 of	 LAw?	An	
Introduction,	 in:	 The	 Place	 of	 Law	 1	 (Sarat/Douglas/Merrill	 Umphrey,	 eds.,	 2006),	 2:	 “[Q]uestions	 of	













its	 relation	 to	 other	 formations	 of	 ‘legal’	 ordering.	 One	 of	 the	 key	 questions	 in	
Thompson’s	 analysis	 concerned	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 ‘legal’	 order	with	which	
the	newly	introduced	system,	represented	by	the	ominous	‘Black	Act’,	was	confronted.	
Rather	 than	 presupposing	 a	 legal	 void,	 the	 carefully	 presented	 analysis	 made	 the	
tension	 visible	 and	 tangible	 that	 existed	 between	what	was	 already	 in	 place	 and	 the	
more	recent	superimposition.	 	The	recognition	of	a	 legal	pluralist	universe	 in	which	a	
legal	 positivist	 order	 intervenes	 and	 with	 which	 it	 will	 (perhaps	 forever)	 stand	 in	






“The	 intellectual	 odyssey	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 moves	 from	 the	
discovery	 of	 indigenous	 forms	 of	 law	 among	 remote	 African	 villagers	 and	 New	
Guinea	 tribesmen	 to	 debates	 concerning	 the	 pluralistic	 qualities	 of	 law	 under	
advanced	 capitalism.	 In	 the	 last	 decade,	 the	 concept	 of	 legal	 pluralism	has	 been	
applied	 to	 the	 study	 of	 social	 and	 legal	 ordering	 in	 urban	 industrial	 societies,	
primarily	the	United	States,	Britain,	and	France.	Indeed,	given	a	sufficiently	broad	
definition	of	the	term	legal	system,	virtually	every	society	is	legally	plural,	whether	
or	 not	 it	 has	 a	 colonial	 past.	 Legal	 pluralism	 is	 a	 central	 theme	 in	 the	
reconceptualization	of	the	law/society	relation.”18	
	
Looking	 at	 the	 RoL	 through	 a	 legal	 pluralist	 lens	 reveals	 a	 complex	 and	 constantly	
shifting	 and	 evolving	 assemblage	 of	 actors,	 norms	 and	 processes.	 Instead	 of	 a	 neatly	
constituted	and	institutionalized	system	of,	say,	 ‘checks	and	balances’,19	 ‘constitutional	
democracy’,20	 and	 the	 legality	 principle,21	 we	 are	 confronted	 with	 a	 living	 organism,	
pulsating	and	shaking,	multidimensional	and	with	sensitive	nervous	fibers,	operating	at	
different	 levels	of	 the	political,	 cultural	and	socio-economic	system.	Most	 importantly,	
however,	 the	 legal	pluralist	RoL	presents	us	with	a	methodological	challenge.	Echoing	
the	 challenges	 that	 early	 private-law	 oriented	 approaches	 to	 comparative	 law	would	
                                       
18	Sally	Engle	Merry,	Legal	Pluralism,	22	Law	&	Society	Review	869	(1988),	869.	
19	 Compare	 Federalist	 Paper	 No.	51,	 “The	 Structure	 of	 the	 Government	 Must	 Furnish	 the	 Proper	 	 and	
Balances	Between	the	Different	Departments”,	http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp.		







public	 law,	which	does	not	reduce	public	 law	to	anything	 ‘governmental’,	done	by	 the	









approaches	 to	 the	 study	 of	 the	 RoL	 and	 other	 contemporary	 work?	 Is	 there	 a	 valid	
concern	 of	 the	 use	 of	 a	 legal	 pluralist	 lens	 leading	 us	 too	 far	 away	 from	what	would	
otherwise	have	been	the	conceptual	frameworks	to	be	employed	for	the	task	of	studying	
the	RoL	 in	a	 transformed,	globalised	 context?	But,	which	concepts	would	be	adequate	
today?	 Which	 conception,	 definition	 or	 model	 of	 the	 RoL	 should	 we	 take	 as	 our	
reference	 point	 and	 which	 disciplinary	 (law,	 political	 science,	 ‘governance	 studies’,	
sociology,	 anthropology)	 or	 subdisciplinary	 frameworks	 (comparative,	 ‘global’	 and	




The	problem	with	 the	opening	of	 the	door	 to	 contesting	voices	 is	 that	not	only	 is	 the	
door	never	 to	be	shut	again,	but	 it	also	becomes	clear	how	that	door	can	at	best	only	
ever	have	been	a	curtain,	a	drapery,	a	sound-muffling	cloth	that	both	blocked	the	view	
                                       
22	 Konrad	 Zweigert/Hein	 Kötz,	 An	 Introduction	 to	 Comparative	 Law,	 3rd	 ed.	 (1996);	 Jonathan	 Hill,	
Comparative	 Law,	 Law	 Reform	 and	 Legal	 Theory,	 9	 Oxford	 Journal	 of	 Legal	 Studies	 101	 (1989);	 Sunil	
Khilnani/Vikram	 Raghavan/Arun	 K.	 Thiruvengadam,	 Introduction:	 Reviving	 South	 Asian	 Comparative	
Constitutionalism,	 in:	 Comparative	 Constitutionalism	 in	 South	 Asia	 1	
(Khilnani/Raghavan/Thiruvengadam,	eds.,	2013),	11.	












alternative,	 centre	 and	 periphery,	 North	 and	 South	 accounts	 of	 the	 RoL	 and	
constitutionalism.	 Such,	 at	 least,	 is	 the	 impression	 we	 begin	 to	 gain	 when	 looking	
beyond	 the	 solid	and	 richly	 stacked	 library	of	Western	 constitutional	 law	and	Rule	of	
Law	theory.	Once	we	let	our	gaze	wander	in	the	search	of	references	to	and	analyses	of	








Rejecting	 a	 traditional	 and	 highly	 influential	 North-American	 and	 European	 bias	 and	
focus	on	the	part	of	much	 ‘comparative	constitutional	 law’,29	scholars	 from	the	 ‘global	
south’,	in	particular,	have	been	arguing	for	a	widening,	if	not	a	reversal	of	perspective.	
Scholars	such	as	Rachel	Sieder,	Javier	Couso	and	Alexandra	Huneeus,	picking	up	on	the	
theme	 of	 ‘judicialization	 of	 politics’,30	 have	 recently	 pressed	 for	 a	 legal	 culture	




claiming	 a	 particular	 role	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 legal	 culture	 to	 expose	 the	 symbolic	 and	
discursive	dimensions	of	law,	second,	by	drawing	on	the	‘law	and	society’	movement	to	
                                       
27	Compare	Dipesh	Chakrabarty,	Provincializing	Europe.	Postcolonial	Thought	and	Historical	Difference,	
2nd	ed.	[orig.	2000]	(2007).	
28	 Antje	 Wiener,	 Global	 Constitutionalism:	 Mapping	 an	 Emerging	 Field.	 Background	 paper	 for	 the	
Conference:	 Constitutionalism	 in	 a	 New	 Key?,	 Berlin	 28-29	 January	 2011	
(http://cosmopolis.wzb.eu/content/program/conkey_Wiener_Mapping-Field.pdf)	(2011).	
29	 “The	 newly	 revitalized	 field	 of	 comparative	 constitutional	 law	 has	 tended	 to	 let	 Europe	 and	 North	




119	 (Caldeira/Kelemen/Whittington,	 eds.,	 2008).	 See	 also	 the	 contributions	 to	 Rachel	 Sieder/Line	
Schjolden/Alan	 Angell	 (ed.^eds.),	 The	 Judicialization	 of	 Politics	 in	 Latin	 America	 (2005).	 A	 fascinating	
study	on	 the	 interpretive-political	 space	opened	up	by	 the	 judicialization	of	politics	 is	offered	by	Philip	










Similarly,	 the	 renowned	 Colombian	 socio-legal	 scholar,	 César	 Rodríguez-Garavito,	
recently	published	a	forceful	call-to-arms	for	a	new,	locally	based	and	locally	informed	
approach	 to	 the	 study	 of	 law	&	 society	with	 regard	 to	 the	 transformations	 currently	
underway	 in	a	number	of	countries	 in	Latin	America.	Lamenting	 that	 “Latin	American	
scholars	 spend	 an	 excessive	 amount	 of	 time,	 resources	 and	 energies	 assimilating,	
translating	and	 interpreting	(or	simply	 ‘staying	current’	with)	materials	 in	 the	North”,	
while	 with	 regard	 to	 legal	 theory	 “[i]n	 their	 writings	 about	 the	 law,	 Latin	 American	
authors	have	a	marked	predilection	for	exegesis	and	commentary	without	reference	to	
the	 actual	 practice	 of	 law	 or,	 even	 less,	 the	 reality	 of	 how	 law	 is	 applied	 in	 local	
contexts”,	 Rodríguez-Garavito	 concludes,	 that	 “[m]any	 scholars	 try	 to	 explain	
institutions	 and	 legal	 practices	 in	 the	 region	 by	 comparing	 their	 realities	 with	 ideal	
types	 (in	 a	 normative	 sense,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 as	 superior	 models)	 extracted	 from	 an	
uncritical	reading	of	the	realities	of	Europe	or	the	United	States.”32	Drawing,	on	the	one	
hand,	 on	 Sousa	 Santos’	 image	 of	 law	 as	 ‘a	map	 of	misreading’,	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 on	
Diego	 López’	 seminal	 study	 from	 200433	 and,	 in	 particular,	 López’	 suggestion	 to	
distinguish	between	 (the	North	as)	a	 “site	of	production”	and	 (the	South	as)	a	 ‘site	of	
reception’	 for	 legal	 theory,	 legal-political	concepts	and	 legal	philosophical	principles,34	
                                       
31	 Alexandra	 Huneeus/Javier	 Couso/Rachel	 Sieder,	 Cultures	 of	 Legality:	 Judicialization	 and	 Political	
Activism	in	Contemporary	Latin	America,	in:	Cultures	of	Legality.	Judicialization	and	Political	Activism	in	
Contemporary	Latin	America	3	(Couso/Huneeus/Sieder,	eds.,	2010),	5.	
32	César	Rodríguez-Garavito,	Remapping	 law	and	society	 in	Latin	America.	Visions	and	topics	 for	a	new	
legal	cartography,	in:	Law	and	Society	in	Latin	America.	A	New	Map	1	(Rodríguez-Garavito,	ed.,	2015),	3,	
4.	
33	 Diego	 Eduardo	 López	 Medina,	 Teoría	 impura	 del	 derecho.	 La	 transformación	 de	 la	 cultura	 jurídica	
latinoamericana.	Prólogo	de	Duncan	Kennedy	(2004),	15-21.	
34	López	Medina,	Teoría	impura,	at	15:	“La	filosofía	del	derecho	presenta	un	grueso	blindaje	frente	a	un	
posible	 asalto	 del	 perspectivismo	 teórico.	 De	 esta	 forma	 se	 genera	 la	 impression	 que	 la	 filosofía	 de	
derecho	son	discursos	abstractos	de	alcance	global.	(…)	Ese	campo	intellectual	transnacional	en	el	que	los	
iusteóricos	 nos	 hallamos	 inmersos	 podría	 denominarse	 teoría	 tansnacional	 del	 derecho	 (TTD)…”	 [The	
philosophy	of	law	presents	a	firm	armor	front	against	a	possible	assault	of	theoretical	perspective.	From	
this	form	arises	the	impression	that	the	philosophy	of	law	consists	of	abstract	discourses	of	global	scope.	










and-development	 thinking?	 How	 can	 critical	 scholarly	 perspectives,	 from	 inside	
and	 outside	 the	 region,	 foster	 a	 horizontal	 transnational	 dialogue	 among	 equals	
about	 law	 in	 Latin	 America?	 How	 can	 we	 create	 a	 community	 of	 scholars	 that	




Latin	America	 to	 contribute	 to	 a	more	 locally	 oriented	 analysis	 and	understanding,	 is	
the	detailed	study	of	different	constitutionalist	projects	in	the	region,	focusing	not	only	
on	the	place	of	socio-economic	rights	in	many	constitutional	texts,	but	on	the	particular	
role	played	by	 constitutional	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 in	 enforcing	 such	 rights.	Connected	
hereto	 and	 indeed	 echoing	 the	 analysis	 offered	 by	 Sieder	 and	 her	 colleagues	 is	 the	
emphasis	on	the	importance	of	impact	studies	regarding	the	real-world	consequences	of	
ambitious	constitutional	shifts.36	Another	important	application	site	in	this	regard	is	the	
intensification	 in	 courts	 as	 well	 as	 public	 debates	 of	 the	 treatment	 of	 and	 the	
engagement	with	rights	of	indigenous	and	other	racially	discriminated	peoples,	brought	
into	the	spotlight	of	wide	attention,	for	example,	through	the	growing	resistance	against	
the	 granting	 of	 mining	 licenses	 for	 foreign	 multinationals	 and	 the	 frequent	 cases	 of	
expropriation	and	dramatic	displacement	of	affected	indigenous	communities.37	 In	the	
                                       
transnational	theory	of	law	(TTL)…”	[PZ	transl.]	On	p.16,	he	continues:	“La	TTD	se	produce	comúnmente	





sitios	 de	 producción	 son	 los	 sitios	 de	 recepción.	 Dentro	 de	 un	 sitio	 de	 recepción,	 por	 lo	 general,	 la	





entitled:	 Indigenous	 Peoples	 and	 Industrial	 Corporations,	 available	 at:	
http://www.un.org/en/events/indigenousday/pdf/Indigenous_Industry_Eng.pdf.	 There,	 it	 says	 on	 p.2.:	
“Particularly	serious	challenges	to	indigenous	rights	are	generated	by	mega-projects,	such	as	mining,	oil,	
gas	 and	 timber	 extraction,	 monoculture	 plantations	 and	 dams.	 The	 impact	 of	 such	 projects	 includes	
 11 
words	of	Julian	Burger	of	the	University	Essex,	who	authored	the	2014	research	report	
on	 “Indigenous	 Peoples,	 Extractive	 Industries	 and	 Human	 Rights”	 for	 the	 European	
Parliament’s	Subcommittee	on	Human	Rights,	“Human	rights	abuses	associated	with	the	
exploration	 and	 exploitation	 of	 non-renewable	 resources	 include,	 among	 others,	
violation	of	the	right	to	life,	forced	displacement	and	destruction	of	the	environment	on	
which	 indigenous	peoples	depend.”38	While	 these	 local	consequences	of	 foreign	direct	
investment	 by	 foreign	multinationals	 in	 resource	 exporting	 regions	 around	 the	world	
have	long	been	a	central	focal	point	and	driver	of	demands	for	the	sovereign	permanent	
use	of	natural	resources39,	the	problem	as	described	by	protagonists	and	supporters	of	
investor	 state	 arbitration	 is	 regularly	 described	 as	 one	 of	 expropriation	 –	 of	 the	
corporation	through	regulatory	interventions	by	the	host	state.40	An	article	published	in	
the	 fall	 of	 2016	 in	 the	 Harvard	 Law	 Review	 concluded	 that	 “one	 factor	 driving	 the	
continuing	 conflict	 between	 indigenous	 peoples	 and	 natural-resource	 development	
relates	 to	 power	 imbalances	 between	 two	 divergent	 international	 legal	 regimes	 —	
indigenous	 rights	 and	 international	 investment	 law	—	 that	 demand	 that	 states	 act	 in	
conflicting	ways	regarding	the	same	territory	and	peoples.”41	Meanwhile,	the	continued	
and	 arguably	 growing	 dependency	 of	 the	 global	 economy	 on	 accessing	 natural	
resources	prompts	further	efforts	in	developing	a	basis	for	natural	resource	exploitation	
                                       
environmental	 damage	 to	 traditional	 lands	 in	 addition	 to	 loss	 of	 culture,	 traditional	 knowledge	 and	
livelihoods,	often	resulting	in	conflict	and	forced	displacement,	further	marginalization,	increased	poverty	
and	a	decline	in	the	health	of	indigenous	peoples.”	
38	 Julian	Burger,	 Indigenous	 Peoples,	 Extractive	 Industries	 and	Human	Rights,	 report	 for	 the	 European	




of	 encroachment	 of	 private	 commercial	 interests	 onto	 the	 lands	 of	 indigenous	 peoples,	 facilitated	 by	
national	 governments,	 which	 began	 long	 ago	 and	 has	 never	 stopped.”	 See	 George	 K.	 Foster,	 Foreign	
Investment	and	Indigenous	Peoples:	Options	for	Promoting	Equlibrium	between	Economic	Development	and	
Indigenous	Rights,	33	Michigan	Journal	of	International	Law	627	(2012),	at	629.	
40	 OECD	 Directorate	 for	 Financial	 and	 Enterprise	 Affairs,	 Working	 Paper	 on	 International	 Investment,	
“Indirect	Expropriation”	and	 the	 “Right	 to	Regulate”	 in	 International	 Investment	Law,	September	2004,	
available	 here:	 https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_4.pdf,	 highlighting	 the	
















How,	 then,	 can	 we	 study	 the	 connections	 between	 these	 dramatic	 conflicts	 between	
different	contentions	regarding	the	content	of	economic	and	political	rights,	on	the	one	
hand,	and	the	changing	perspectives	in	comparative	and	 ‘global’	constitutional	 law,	on	
the	 other?	Which	methodological	 tools	 are	 required	 to	make	 visible	 the	 place	 of	 the	
‘RoL’	 in	 a	 much	 wider	 space	 of	 legal-theoretical	 and	 socio-economic	 contention?	 An	
important	 set	 of	 sign-posts	 can	 be	 taken	 from	 ‘law	 and	 development’	 scholarship	 in	
which	the	assertion	of	the	RoL	has	always	been	contested	and	where	scholars	have	long	
been	 stressing	 the	 importance	 of	 studying	 the	 presently	 offered	 models	 of	 the	 RoL	
against	 a	 complex	 and	 violent	 history	 of	 colonial	 rule	 and	 imperialism.43	 This	
scholarship	 has	 very	 productively	 informed	 and	 been	 in	 dialogue	 with	 work	 on	




a	 glimpse	at	 constitutionalism	discourses	 in	Latin	America	 through	 the	 lens	of	 locally	
experienced	 transformations,	 shaped	 by	 local	 and	 regional	 discourses,	 political	 and	
judicial	interventions	as	well	as	public	debates	seems,	however,	to	reveal	the	blind	spots	
of	what	Diego	López	Medina	calls	‘TTD’.	In	applying	a	set	of	constitutional	law	principles	
as	 they	were	developed	 in	North	America	 and	Western	Europe	as	 a	 yardstick	 against	
and	in	comparison	to	which	developments	in	other	parts	of	the	world	can	be	measured,	
the	 TTD	 represents	 no	more	 than	what	Medina	 depicted	 as	 an	 ‘abstract	 discourse	 of	
global	scope’.	What	escapes	the	parameters	of	such	abstract	theorizing	is	the	particular	
nature	of	what	happens	locally,	and	what	cannot	be	studied	from	the	high	oxygen-less	
                                       
42	 Jorge	 E.	 Viñuales,	 International	 Investment	 Law	 and	 Natural	 Resource	 Governance.	 E15Initiative.	
Geneva:	 International	 Centre	 for	 Trade	 and	 Sustainable	 Development	 (ICTSD)	 and	 World	 Economic	










altitude	 of	 theoretical	 discourses	 alone.	 And	 it	 is	 the	 resistance	 against	 such	 abstract	
and,	by	consequence,	hegemonizing	theorizing	which	informs	and	drives	a	lot	of	critical,	
local	 scholarship	and	which	experts	 in	 the	Global	North	and	 the	West	need	 to	engage	




Similar	 impulses	 to	 rethink,	 to	 re-localise	 and	 to	 critically	 reassess	 the	 Western	
influence	 on	 shaping	 ‘global’	 and	 ‘comparative’	 constitutional	 law	 as	 the	 taken-for-
granted	frameworks	for	thinking	about	the	Rule	of	Law	also	come	from	Asia.	Not	only	
are	 important	and	groundbreaking	 judicial	developments	widely	discussed	as	matters	
of	 not	merely	 ‘local’	 concern47,	 but	what	 becomes	 visible	 is	 a	 far-reaching	 critique	 of	
many	 of	 the	 inherited	 assumptions	 regarding	 the	 purpose	 and	 scope	 of	 comparative	
constitutional	law:	
	
“The	 dominant	 players	 in	 the	 field	 of	 comparative	 law	 extolled	 the	 virtues	 of	 a	
‘functionalist’	 approach	 which	 would	 use	 comparative	 models	 and	 examples	 to	
solve	 problems	 and	 arrive	 at	 practical	 solutions.	 It	 was	 therefore	 natural	 that	
comparative	 constitutional	 law	would	 also	 be	 affected	 by	 this	 overall	 approach.	
                                       
45	See,	for	example,	the	contributions	to	the	important	collection	of	essays	resulting	from	a	collaboration	
among	 scholars	 in	 Colombia	 and	 the	 United	 States:	 Helena	 Alviar	 García/Karl	 Klare/Lucy	 A.	Williams	
(ed.^eds.),	 Social	 and	 Economic	 Rights	 in	 Theory	 and	 Practice.	 Critical	 Inquiries	 (2015).	 See	 also	 two	
recent,	well-informed	overviews	of	 theory	developments	 in	Latin	America	 from	Germany,	one	 from	the	
director	at	the	Max	Planck	Institute	in	Heidelberg	(Armin	von	Bogdandy,	Ius	Constitutionale	Commune	en	
América	 Latina	 -	 Beobachtungen	 zu	 einem	 transformatorischen	 Ansatz	 demokratischer	
Verfassungsstaatlichkeit,	75	Heidelberg	Journal	of	International	Law	(ZaöRV	-	HJIL)	345	(2015),	and	one	
from	 a	 young	 legal	 scholar	 at	 the	 Viadrina	 University	 in	 Frankfurt	 (Oder):	 Heiner	 Fechner,	 Neue	
Rechtstheorie(n)	 in	Lateinamerika.	Vom	Alternativen	Recht	zum	Emanzipatorischen	Rechtspluralismus,	48	
Kritische	Justiz	446	(2015).	
46	 Jean	 Comaroff/John	 L.	 Comaroff,	 Theory	 from	 the	 South:	Or,	How	Euro-America	 is	 Evolving	Toward	
Africa	 (The	 Radical	 Imagination)	 (2011);	 Dipesh	 Chakrabarty,	 Provincializing	 Europe.	 Postcolonial	
Thought	 and	 Historical	 Difference,	 2nd	 ed.	 [orig.	 2000]	 (2007);	 Hamid	 Dabashi,	 Can	 Non-Europeans	
Think?	(With	a	foreword	by	Walter	Mignolo)	(2015).	See	also	Sunil	Khilnani/Vikram	Raghavan/Arun	K.	
Thiruvengadam,	 Introduction:	 Reviving	 South	 Asian	 Comparative	 Constitutionalism,	 in:	 Comparative	
Constitutionalism	 in	 South	 Asia	 1	 (Khilnani/Raghavan/Thiruvengadam,	 eds.,	 2013),	 10-11:	 “Even	 as	
scholars	 have	 termed	 this	 era	 ‘the	 heyday	 for	 scholars	 of	 comparative	 constitutional	 law	 and	 politics’,	
they	are	quick	to	acknowledge	that	certain	‘foundational,	ontological,	epistemological	and	methodological	
questions	concerning	the	field’s	purpose,	scope	and	nature’	still	need	to	be	addressed.”	
47	 Rehan	 Abeyratne/Nilesh	 Sinha,	 Insular	 and	 Inconsistent:	 India’s	 Naz	 Foundation	 Judgment	 in	
Comparative	Perspective,	39	Yale	Journal	of	International	Law	(online)	74	(2014);	Sujit	Choudhry,	How	to	
Do	 Comparative	 Constitutional	 Law	 in	 India:	 Naz	 Foundation,	 Same	 Sex	 Rights,	 and	 Dialogical	
Interpretation,	in:	Comparative	Constitutionalism	in	South	Asia	45	(Khi-lnani/Raghavan/Thiruvengadam,	
eds.,	 2013),	 46:	 “Is	 the	 Indian	 Constitution	 merely	 a	 legal	 means	 to	 implement	 rights,	 that	 exist	









Resisting	 the	 circular	 referral	 to	 the	 ‘usual	 suspects’	 in	 global/comparative	
constitutional	law	–	including	“Canada,	Israel,	Germany,	New	Zealand,	South	Africa,	the	
United	Kingdom,	 and	 the	United	 States”49	 –	 locally	 informed	efforts	 of	 giving	 voice	 to	
alternative,	 non-hegemonic	 and	 non-mainstream	 lines	 of	 constitutional	 law	
development	are	making	the	map	more	detailed,	but	at	the	same	time	more	messy	and	
more	 incoherent.	 “The	appellation	 ‘South	Asia’	 constitutes	variegated	 feats	of	 colonial	
and	 imperial	geographies,	subsequently	reinforced	by	the	time-places	of	 the	Cold	War	
and	disciplines	curiously	names	as	‘area	studies’.	[…]	...given	the	‘genius’	of	colonial	rule	
to	 produce	 ‘severely	 divided	 societies	 suffused	 with	 ‘political’	 constructions	 of	






“To	 state	 the	 obvious,	 SAC	 [South	 Asian	 Constitutionalism]	 founding	 choices	
remain	ambivalent.	Choosing	forms	of	governance	is	never	an	endeavor	at	wiping	











                                       
48	Khilnani	et	al,	Introduction,	11.	
49	Choudhry,	How	to	Do,	at	47.	





heritage	 which	 continues	 to	 exert	 its	 stronghold	 via	 constitutional	 design	 export,	
foreign	direct	investment	and	trade	rules,	is	not	merely	directed	against	constitutional	
principles	of	Western	design.	More	specifically,	the	target	is	the	narrowing	of	a	horizon	
of	 possibilities	 that	 results	 from	 having	 accepted	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 constitution	 and	 of	
constitutionalism	 as	 “governance	machines”,	 through	which	 particular	 and	 externally	




rights	 between	 foreign	 direct	 investment	 protagonists	 and	 local	 indigenous	
communities,	 mentioned	 earlier.	 At	 the	 centre	 of	 that	 confrontation	 are	 competing	
interpretations	of	the	economic	orientation	of	the	constitutional	text	as	it	serves	as	the	
basis	 for	a	balancing	of	 individual	and	collective	rights.	 In	2008,	 the	 indigenous	rights	
scholar,	Lillian	Aponte	Miranda	pointed	to	
	
“a	marked	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 natural	 resource	 extraction	 projects,	 often	
executed	through	the	joint	efforts	of	states	and	transnational	business	enterprises,	
[which]	 has	 aggravated	 the	 threat	 to	 indigenous	peoples’	 ability	 to	 control	 their	
traditional	 lands	 and	 resources.4	 The	 execution	 of	 natural	 resource	 extraction	
projects	 typically	 implicates	 indigenous	peoples’	 land	tenure	systems	and	formal	
state	 law	 regarding	 the	 ownership	 and	 allocation	of	 the	 territory	 at	 issue.	 Thus,	




investment	 law,	on	 the	one	hand,	and	 indigenous	uses	and	traditional	 title	 to	 land,	on	
the	other,	 attains	 further	poignancy	 in	 that	 it	 illustrates	 the	point	made	 earlier	 about	
Weber.	For	Weber	already	it	was	clear	that	a	legal	order	does	neither	emerge	nor	stand	
in	isolation	from	the	socio-economic	developments	that	are	going	on	around	it.	And,	as	
scholars	 in	 the	 newly	 revived	 tradition	 of	Weber-inspired	 economic	 sociology	 of	 law	
suggest,	there	is	today	a	pressing	urgency	to	unpack	the	law’s	connection	to	and	its	role		
                                       
52	Baxi,	Modelling,	28.	
53	 Lillian	 Aponte	 Miranda,	 Uploading	 the	 Local:	 Assessing	 the	 Contemporary	 Relationship	 Between	
Indigenous	Peoples’	Land	Tenure	Systems	and	International	Human	Rights	Law	Regarding	the	Allocation	of	







As	much	of	Western	 legal	 and	political	 theory	 remains	 focused	on	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	
rise	 of	 the	 nation	 state,	 the	 role	 and	 legacies	 of	 civil	 revolutions	 and	 the	 fate	 of	 the	
(European,	Westphalian)	 nation-state	 in	 the	 21st	 century,	 post-colonial	 scholars	 have	
been	drawing	different	 historical	 lineages	 in	 the	 construction	of	 political	 identity	 and	
sovereignty	between	the	 times	of	European	colonial	expansion	and	 the	present.55	The	
repercussions	on	law	and	legal	theory	are	only	slowly	becoming	fully	accessible.	‘Post-




interdisciplinary	 efforts	 to	 resist,	 unpack	 and	 challenge	 universalizing	 narratives,	
concepts	and	explanations	as	well	as	objectifying	accounts	and	streamlining	historical	
narratives.	 Law	 and	 legal	 scholarship	 have	 been	 playing	 an	 intriguing	 part	 in	 such	
efforts.	 With	 globalization	 having	 had	 unearthing	 effects	 on	 the	 imaginary	 and	


















J.	 Cerny,	 Globalization	 and	 the	 Changing	 Logic	 of	 Collective	 Action,	 49	 International	 Organisation	 595	
(1995),	 and	 Ian	 Clark,	 Globalization	 and	 International	 Relations	 Theory	 (1999),	 4:	 “The	 emerging	
literature	 about	 globalization	 is	 characterized	by	marked	diversity…	However,	 as	 a	 broad	 introductory	
generalization,	it	can	be	said	that	it	is	very	much	engaged	in	a	debate	about	the	retreat	or	resilience	of	the	





story,	 the	 ‘other’,	 the	 alternative	perspective	on	 the	described	 trajectory.	This	kind	of	
Eurocentrism	 has	 thus	 become	 object	 of	 various	 critical	 attacks,58	 and	 legal	
scholarship’s	 engagement	 with	 postcolonial	 studies	 must	 be	 seen,	 at	 least	 in	 those	
quarters	where	it	is	occurring,	as	both	irreversible	and	transformative.59	Meanwhile,	the	
implications	of	 postcolonialism	on	 the	 study	of	 law	are	 as	diversified	 as	 the	 field,	 the	
idea,	 the	conceptions	(of	postcolonialism)	 themselves.	 In	 the	 legal	 field	with	 the	more	





In	 two	 powerful	 works	 of	 the	 last	 few	 years,	 the	 authors	 have	 deliberately	 and	
consciously	placed	their	analysis	of	the	RoL	in	both	conceptual-methodological	as	well	
as	 historical-political	 contexts.	 Studying	 Sundhya	 Pahuja’s	 monographic	 treatment,	
‘Decolonising	 International	 Law’,62	we	 are	 offered	 a	 razor-sharp	 analysis	 of	 the	 abyss	
between	 the	 paper-form	 and	 the	 real-world	 impact	 of	 the	 legal	 forms	 which	
accompanied	the	transition	of	ex-colonized	nations	into	the	formal	status	of	‘sovereign	
and	equal’	members	of	the	United	Nations.	Pahuja	bookends	her	scrutiny	of	the	rights	of	
passage	 from	colonization	 into	sovereign	state-hood	with	a	series	of	 reflections	about	
the	 process	 through	which	 a	 certain	 power	 constellation	 comes	 under	 law	 and	 is,	 in	
other	words,	‘legalized’.	In	that	regard,	Pahuja	argues	at	the	beginning	of	her	book	that	
“...the	 ‘universalisation’	 of	 international	 law	 […]	 was	 not	 the	 neutral	 inclusion	 of	 all	
peoples	within	the	international	legal	order,	but	rather	a	process	by	which	a	particular	
                                       
58	 See,	 e.g.,	 the	 work	 by	 Boaventura	 de	 Sousa	 Santos,	 The	 Processes	 of	 Globalisation,	 Eurozine	
http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2002	 (2002);	 see	 also	 the	 excellent	 collection	 and	 commentary	 by	




of	postcolonialism,	and	elsewhere,	 that	European	or	Western	 identity	 is	constituted	 in	opposition	to	an	
alterity	that	it	has	itself	constructed.”	
60	 James	 T.	 Gathii,	 TWAIL:	 A	 Brief	 History	 of	 Its	 Origins,	 Its	 Decentralized	 Network,	 and	 a	 Tentative	
Bibliography,	3	Trade,	Law	and	Development	26	(2011).	
61	 Antony	 Anghie,	Colonialism	 and	 the	 Birth	 of	 International	 Institutions:	 Sovereignty,	 Economy,	 and	 the	
Mandate	 System	 of	 the	 League	 of	 Nations,	 34	 N.Y.U.	 J.	 Int'l	 L.	 &	 Pol.	 513	 (2002);	 see	 also	 Jochen	 von	
Bernstorff,	 German	 International	 Law	 Scholarship	 and	 the	 Postcolonial	 Turn,	 EJIL	 Talk!	 (Blog	 of	 the	
European	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law),	 7	January	2015,	 available	 at:	 http://www.ejiltalk.org/german-
international-law-scholarship-and-the-postcolonial-turn/.		






accommodated	 by	 the	 international	 community.”63	 The	 RoL	 is	 identified	 as	 playing	 a	
crucial	role	in	this	process,	as	it	provides	the	powerful	master	category	to	capture	not	
only	 the	 descriptive	 acknowledgment	 and	 endorsement	 of	 an	 emerging	 and	 in	 itself	
unquestionably	justified	‘international	rule	of	law’,	but	also	the	prescriptive	proposition	
that	 the	 RoL	 encapsulate	 the	 political-organisational	 decisions	 necessary	 for	






chapters	bring	the	the	historical-critical	analysis	 together	 in	a	sobering	account	of	 the	
seemingly	unstoppable	triumph	march	that	the	“rule	of	law”	had	experienced	both	post-
1945	 and	 post-1990.	Whereas,	 however,	 at	 the	 end	 of	World	War	 II	 and	 during	 the	
concurring	struggles	of	formerly	colonized	nations	to	define	their	however	meager	role	
at	 the	 table	 of	 the	 international	 community,	 the	 RoL	 was	 invoked	 as	 a	 principle	 of	
desirable	 political	 (international	 order),	 its	 invocation	 since	 the	 1990s	 came	 with	 a	
distinct	 association	 of	 the	 RoL	 with	 the	 actual	 historical	 ‘achievement’	 of	 Western	
liberalism,	human	rights	and	democracy.65	The	end	of	the	Cold	War	came	to	provide	the	
historical	 moment	 for	 a	 long-harbored	 normative	 closure:	 human	 rights	 could	 and,	
indeed,	 should	 now	 be	 defended,	 fought	 for	 and	 fought	 over	 in	 every	 corner	 of	 the	
world,	 now	 that	 their	 previous	 ideological	 ambiguity	 had	 given	 way	 to	 universal	
recognition.66	With	 the	 overcoming	 of	 its	 ideological	 subtexts	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 cold	
war,	human	rights	were	now	rid	of	all	ideology	–	they	were,	in	other	words,	“universally	
true”	 and,	 by	 implication,	 free	 from	 and	 immune	 to	 any	 possible	 contestation.67	
Meanwhile,	 the	 RoL	 becomes	 entrenched	 as	 development	 doctrine,	 mantra	 and	 goal	
when	 it	 is	 rhetorically	 employed	 to	 link	 the	 imagined	 international	 community	 to	 the	








than	 being	 the	 governing	 principle	 for	 the	 relationship	 between	 states.69	 As	 liberal	
international	 relations	 (IR)	 scholars	 such	 as	 Anne-Marie	 Slaughter	 zero	 in	 on	 the	
internal	governance	structures	of	the	state,	the	shift	from	a	world	of	sovereign	states	to	
that	 of	 a	world	 community	 as	 agent	 of	 scrutinizing,	 protecting	 as	well	 as,	 eventually,	
disseminating	and	promoting	state-internal	democratic	governance	becomes	decisive.70	
The	 particular	 Western,	 if	 not	 U.S.-driven,	 experience	 of	 institutionalized	 democratic	
market	 governance	 becomes	 the	 unquestioned	 blue-print	 for	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law71	 as	
transnational	 principle	 and	 as	 justification	 for	 an	 ever-accelerating	 and	 expanding	
managerialist	protection	machine.72		
	
Professor	Pahuya’s	 award-winning	 analysis	 addressed	 the	 “instability	 of	 international	
law”	at	a	time,	where	the	world	order	had	become	increasingly	and	perhaps	irrevocably	
fragmented	 and	 contested.	 Bringing	 together	 a	 number	 of	 critical	 strands	 of	
international	legal	thought	–	from	international	economic	law73	to	post-colonialist	‘third	
world	 approaches	 to	 international	 law’74	 for	 a	 convincing	 deconstruction	 of	 the	
international-universalist	 human	 rights	 and	 RoL	 imaginary,	 she	 offered	 significant	





                                       







72	 For	 a	 cutting	 interpretation	 from	 a	 feminist-legal-theory	 perspective,	 see	 Anne	 Orford,	 Muscular	














post-1965	Singapore	and	 it	 is	 this	 context	which	 is	unfolded	 in	 its	historical,	political,	
economic,	 legal	 and	 discursive	 dimensions.	 Through	 an	 amazingly	 close	 reading	 of	
various	pieces	of	Singaporean	laws	and	regulations,	Professor	Rajah’s	study	achieves	a	
unique	 multiplication	 of	 our	 perspective	 on	 and	 understanding	 of	 the	 RoL.	 In	 each	
invocation	of	the	RoL	by	the	Singaporean	government,	its	long-time	head	of	state	or	its	
various	 governmental	 spokespersons,	 Rajah	makes	 us	 see	 the	 constitutive	 role	 of	 the	
principle	 by,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 invoking	 an	 external,	 non-Singaporean	 tradition,	while	
extinguishing,	invisibilizing	and	‘silencing’	pre-existing	Singaporean	legal	traditions,	on	










between	 legal	 language/speech	 and	 power.79	 Through	 the	 course	 of	 case	 studies	
pertaining	 to	 Singaporean	 laws	 on	 vandalism,	 press	 freedom,	 the	 legal	 profession,	
religious	 practices	 and	 the	 public	 order,	 Rajah’s	 analysis	 follows	 the	 state’s	 and	 its	
various	 regulatory	 bodies’	 discursive	 mapping	 deep	 into	 the	 daily	 life	 of	 regulatory	
practices	and	is	thus	able	to	reveal	the	life	between	the	textual	nature	of	the	‘RoL’	and	
its	 society-and	reality-shaping	operations.80	Ultimately,	 the	RoL	 to	which	 the	author	–	
by	 self-declaration	 –	 remains	 sympathetic,81	 has	 been	 proven	 to	 have	 achieved	 the	
opposite	 from	what	we	 (might)	 have	been	 associating	 it	with	 –	with	 the	 Singaporean	
                                       
75	Jothie	Rajah,	Authoritarian	Rule	of	Law.	Legislation,	Discourse	and	Legitimacy	in	Singapore	(2012).	
76	Id.,	at	35,	37.	














to	 democratic	 governance’	 and	 the	 international	 rule	 of	 law	 as	 governing	 principle	
between	 these	 citizens	 and	 the	 international	 community	 –	 bypassing	 the	 sovereign	
states	and	their	(rightful,	under	public	international	law)	claims	to	govern	their	internal	
affairs.	Whereas	in	Pahuya’s	account,	we	are	directed	towards	a	critique	of	the	Western	
neo-liberal	 invocation	 of	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law	 as	 a	 free	 pass	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 affairs	 of	
Slaughter’s	‘non-liberal	states’	–	all	in	the	name	of	the	RoL	–	,	Rajah	dives	deep	into	just	
these	internal	affairs	in	order	to	trace	the	myriad	ways	in	which	an	illiberal	State	–	all	in	




see	 how	 the	 state	 (in	 this	 case	 Singapore)	 is	 doing	 exactly	what	 the	World	Bank,	 the	
‘coalition	of	the	willing’	or	other	zealous	RoL	advocates	have	been	doing	–	internally	and	
externally.	While	 these	 are	 invoking	 the	 RoL	 in	 its	 pure	 transcendent	 (nonsensical83)	
form	while,	 in	truth,	disembedding	it	 from	a	real	world	of	 inequality	and	post-colonial	
blithe,	 in	which	 the	declaration	 of	 sovereign	 equality	 is	 a	 far	 cry	 for	most,	 the	 others	
(such	as	the	Singaporean	state)	call	on	the	RoL	in	order	to	justify	the	repression	of	local	
claims	 in	 the	 name	 of	 defending	 externally	 resonant	 rights	 and	 principles.	 As	 the	
normative	 difference	 between	 the	 international	 community	 and	 its	 small	 circle	 of	
(militarily)	 persuasive	 spokespeople	 and	 authoritarian	 governments	 becomes	 elusive,	
what	 begins	 to	 emerge	 is	 an	 ever	 clearer	 and	 more	 fully	 accentuated	 picture	 of	 a	
fragmented	yet	fully	operational	holding	structure	of	transnational	managerialism.	Such	
managerialism	 has	 been	 manifesting	 itself	 in	 various	 forms	 –	 ranging	 from	
‘humanitarian	 intervention’	 to	 ‘economic’	or	 ‘technical	assistance’	–	while	 in	each	case	
the	 pertinent	 justificatory	 basis	 has	 been	 a	 rhetoric	 of	 necessity	 and	 efficiency.	 The	
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displacement	 of	 a	 much	 more	 multilayered,	 eternally	 open-ended	 deliberation	 about	
competing	and	conflicting	values	by	a	more	output-oriented	rationality	has	significant	
consequences	for	the	ability	of	carrying	out	a	political	debate	through	the	means	of	law	
and	 legal	 language.	 Expert	 language,	 something	 we	 already	 encountered	 in	 our	
identification	of	the	powerful	effect	of	indicators	as	displacing	the	RoL	as	actor	behind	
the	 numbers	 –	 invokes	 ‘progress’	 in	 international	 economic	 development84,	 ‘stability’	




analysis	 of	 the	 increasingly	 hermeneutically	 closed,	 self-referential	 language	 regime	
that	 ‘experts’	(lawyers,	economists,	political	scientists)	have	been	making	available	for	
amenable	 use	 for	 every	 possible	 ‘crisis’.	 “Expertise	 –	 economic	 expertise,	 scientific	
expertise,	 legal	 expertise,	 social	 and	 political	 expertise,	 institutional	 and	 managerial	
expertise,	expertise	in	the	lessons	of	history	and	the	universal	practicalities	of	everyday	
life	 –	 fills	 the	 bill.	 Those	 who	 exercise	 the	 powers	 of	 expertise	 rarely	 think	 they	 are	
‘governing	 the	 world’.	 Their	 mandate	 and	 project	 is	 always	 far	 more	 specific,	 their	
language	more	universal.	As	a	result,	 their	powers	remain	obscure,	 the	opportunity	to	
identify	and	contest	 their	 rulership	vanishing	point	 rare.”88	What	makes	 the	power	of	
expert	language	so	pervasive	and	at	the	same	time	so	elusive	from	the	point	of	view	of	
political	 agency,	 is	 the	 matter-of-factness	 in	 its	 ascertainment	 vis-à-vis	 ‘problems’	
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same	 time	 the	 striking	 number	 of	 contestations,	 be	 that	 on	 the	 conceptual	 or	 the	
empirical	 level,	 underscores	 the	 urgency	 of	 further	 and	 also	 differently	 situated	
investigation.	What	the	work	by	scholars	cited	in	the	preceding	overview	illustrates	is	a	
pressing	need	for	approaches	that	critically	acknowledge	and	draw	on	legal-theoretical	
and	 post-colonial	 scholarship	 in	 order	 to	 decenter	 and	 relativize	 an	 otherwise	 too	
narrowly	 shaped	 investigation	 into	 the	 past	 and	 future	 of	 a	 heavily	 strained	 concept.	
The	 legal	 pluralist	 engagement	 with	 the	 RoL	 might	 point	 into	 a	 promising	 direction	
here.	Rather	 than	confirming	the	cliché	of	an	emerging	transnational	regulatory	order	
that	 dethrones	 the	 nation-state,	 makes	 a	 mockery	 of	 state-based,	 governmental	
sovereignty	and	adopts	an	overly	permissive	stance	as	to	what	counts	as	 ‘law’,	hereby	
allegedly	 treating	soft	and	hard,	 informal	and	 formal	 law	alike,	 the	above	analysis	has	
confirmed	something	altogether	different.	Instead	of	heralding	the	end	of	the	state	and	
(its)	law,	the	legal	pluralist	lens	has	begun	to	make	visible	the	many	local	instantiations	
of	 legal-regulatory	 regimes	 in	 states	of	 transformation.	Pahuja’s	 study,	but	even	more	
particularly	 the	 analysis	 offered	 by	 Rajah,	 offered	 us	 a	 convincing	 testimony	 of	 the	
battle	 over	 the	 rule	of	 law	 ‘on	 the	 ground’,	 in	 very	 concrete	 and	 complex,	 historically	
shaped	and	presently	evolving	socio-economic	and	geopolitical	settings.	As	we	continue	
to	 further	 study	 the	 ROL’s	 continuing	 diffusion	 and	 transformation	 in	 the	 areas	 of	
technical	 warfare90	 and	 quantification,91	 questions	 of	 local	 perspective,	 input	 and	
contestation	will	become	ever	more	important.	
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